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Abstract
Leniency programs reduce sanctions for law violators that self-report. We focus on
their ability to deter cartels and organized crime by increasing incentives to “cheat” on
partners. Optimally designed “courageous” leniency programs reward the …rst party
that reports with the …nes paid by all other parties, and achieve the …rst best: complete
and costless deterrence. “Moderate” leniency programs that only reduce or cancel sanc-
tions may deter organized crime (a) by protecting an agent that defects from …nes and
from other agents’ punishment; and (b) by increasing the riskiness of crime/collusion,
in the sense of Harsanyi and Selten (1988).
JEL Classification: L13, L40, K21, K40
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1The son said to him, “Father, I have sinned against heaven and against you. I
am no longer worthy to be called your son”. But the father said to his servants,
“Quick! Bring the best robe and put it on him. Put a ring on his …nger and
sandals on his feet. Bring the fattened calf and kill it. Let’s have a feast and
celebrate.” (Luke 15, 21-23)
This paper characterizes optimal law enforcement policies against cartels and organized
crime, and evaluates their potential deterrence and welfare e¤ects. The focus is on leniency
programs, reduced sanctions for wrongdoers that report information on their partners’ misbe-
havior to the law enforcing agency. These schemes attracted much attention in recent years
thanks to the new Corporate Leniency Policy for Antitrust violations introduced by the
US’s Department of Justice (DoJ) in 1993.1 This policy is widely regarded as a tremendous
s u c c e s s .S i n c ei t si n t r o d u c t i o n ,a nu n p r e c e d e n t e dn u m b e ro fc a r t e l sh a sb e e nd e t e c t e da n d
successfully prosecuted, enormous …nes (up to US$ 500 millions) have been levied against
participants, and several top executives from di¤erent countries have served jail sentences
in the US.2 This celebrated success led Australia, Canada, the European Union, Germany,
New Zealand, the UK and other countries to introduce analogous programs, and many more
to discuss their possible introduction (OECD, 2001).
Although breaking down adversary coalitions by playing members against each other is a
consolidated practice since Julius Cesar – who named it Divide et Impera –w ec a n n o tb es u r e
that current leniency policies are the success they are claimed to be. The optimistic view
that the increase in convicted cartels re‡ects an increase in cartel deterrence is plausible,
but the actual change in active cartels caused by the Corporate Leniency Policy cannot be
observed. In principle the observed increase in detected cartels could even be due to an
increase in cartel activity. And even if current leniency programs do increase deterrence,
we do not know whether di¤erently designed ones would have done better. This calls for
theoretical analysis.
The issue is not only relevant to Antitrust policy. As an illegal activity involving many
agents, cartels can be considered a form of organized crime, certainly not the most harmful.
Many more dangerous and far reaching forms of crime are organized and share crucial
features with cartels: all of Ma…as’ and gangs’ activities, terrorism, all forms of corruption
(where at least two parties are involved, a briber and a bribee), all kinds of illegal trade
(drugs, arms and people ta¢cking, where at least a buyer and a seller are involved), large
frauds (including …nancial ones), and any other form of crime exercised at too large a scale for
an isolated individual. In fact, any criminal activity above a certain scale must be organized.
And needless to say, the costs of organized crime to society are enormous. Understanding the
optimal design of law enforcement policies against organized crime, therefore, is of primary
importance.
All forms of organized crime share with cartels three fundamental and intertwined fea-
tures that distinguish them from ordinary crime, and that are crucial to the design of e¤ective
1Toghether with the companion Individual Leniency Policy. The DoJ introduced a leniency policy for
cartels already in 1978, but the old policy was much less generous than the new one. As a result, very few
…rms applied for leniency before 1993.
2See Spratling (1998, 1999) and Hammond (2000, 2001) for an overview.
2law enforcement policies. The …rst feature is that cooperation among several agents is re-
quired to perform the criminal activity, so that free riding, “hold-up”, and “moral hazard”
issues become relevant. The second one is that organized crime takes the form of ongoing
criminal relations: instead of the isolated criminal act with given bene…t b and harm h
familiar from the law enforcement literature (the next section presents a literature review),
organized crime delivers ‡ows of present and expected future bene…ts and damages. The
third is that cooperating wrongdoers, by acting together, inevitably end up having informa-
tion on each others’ criminal behavior that could be reported to third parties. This third
feature is clearly a consequence of the …rst, but also the second is. Criminal organizations
su¤er of an intrinsic “governance problem” since to curb moral hazard and ensure internal
cooperation they cannot rely on explicit contracts enforced by the legal system. This is
why, as cartels, all forms of organized crime must take the form of criminal relations.T h e n
implicit/relational contracts can be sustained by the “carrot” of expected future gains from
the criminal activity, together with the “stick” of the (often very harsh) punishments against
cheaters.
Because organized crime requires cooperation between multiple wrongdoers and a certain
degree of internal trust, one way prosecutors have traditionally fought it is by shaping private
incentives to play one party against the other, by ensuring that they …nd themselves in a
situation as close as possible to a Prisoner’s Dilemma. This is the idea behind leniency
programs.3 These policies have been used more or less explicitly to …ght most forms of
organized crime. Most notably, they have been extensively and successfully used in the US
and Italy to …ght Sicilian Ma…a, and are routinely used (and misused) in the US to …ght
drug-dealing and related crimes.4
From a theoretical viewpoint, the Prisoner’s Dilemma game is perhaps the …rst and best
known model of a leniency policy: the sanctions for a prisoner are reduced to induce him
to confess and prove guilty his former partner. The Prisoner’s Dilemma refers to a situa-
tion in which the joint law violators have already been detected, and the leniency program
seeks to elicit additional information to facilitate prosecution. Leniency programs are also
advocated and implemented as a way to directly deter organized crime, by inducing unde-
tected wrongdoers to spontaneously self-report and “turn in” their partners. The idea is
undermining trust between wrongdoers with the increased risk that one of them unilaterally
reports to enjoy the bene…ts of the leniency program (which are typically restricted to the
…rst reporting party). Indeed, a crucial new feature of the Corporate Leniency Policy is its
“Amnesty Program” – Section A – that “automatically” awards full immunity from all sanc-
tions to the …rst, and only the …rst cartel member that spontaneously reports information
before an investigation is opened.5 According to DoJ o¢cials, it is this new feature that led
3To be precise, agents involved in organized crime are in a Prisoner’s Dilemma-like situation already
without the leniency program, since each of them can cheat on the others “running away with the money”.
But typically the situation is repeated, and criminal/collusive agreements can be sustained by reputational
forces. What leniency programs do is changing the payo¤s in this dynamic game, so that the choice between
colluding and defecting-and-reporting again looks similar to a static Prisoner’s Dilemma.
4The misuse occurs when prosecutors and courts rely exclusively (or mainly) upon a testi-
mony obtained in exchange for leniency. A useful introduction to this incredible practice is at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/snitch/. Throughout the paper we will assume that the
party applying for leniency must report “hard information” against his partners to obtain it, and that his
testimony is not required nor admitted.
5The amnesty typically includes all the …rm’s employees. In February 2002 the European Commission
3many companies to come, and often rush forward with information on their cartel.6 This
paper focuses on this aspect of leniency programs, their ability to deter organized crime by
undermining trust, increasing wrongdoers’ incentives to spontaneously report information
when they are not under any sort of investigation.
We study a stylized model of law enforcement, in the spirit of Gary Becker (1968),
that includes the possibility to o¤er reduced or negative …nes (rewards …nanced by …nes
imposed on convicted wrongdoers) to agents that report “hard” information on their criminal
organization, and to impose higher …nes against repeated/recidivous o¤enders. The other
crucial departure from Becker’s contribution is that our model is dynamic: we focus on
cartels and organized crime, so that the isolated criminal act is replaced by a criminal
relation, an equilibrium in the dynamic game between multiple wrongdoers.
First we determine the optimal law enforcement policy in the absence of leniency poli-
cies. Besides establishing a benchmark, this exercise delivers some interesting insights. It
shows that absent leniency programs, law enforcing agencies should commit not to target
agents that unilaterally defect from collusive/criminal strategies, and should make this pol-
icy public. The reason is close to the logic of leniency: if agents know that they will not
be …ned for their past crimes if they defect from the collusive/criminal agreement, they are
more prone to do it, which makes such agreements harder to sustain.
We then analyze how leniency programs a¤ect the collusive/criminal game. We …nd that
when these programs are su¢ciently generous, they can be exploited by colluding agents who
may agree to report each period, enjoy leniency and avoid part or all …nes. This increases
the value of a collusive/criminal agreement and reduces the overall deterrence e¤ect of the
law enforcement policy. We also …nd that when these programs are su¢ciently generous,
they directly increase agents’ incentive to unilaterally defect and report information. An
agent that defects and reports will be sure not to be …ned for past collusive behavior, and
can cash the reward (if one is present). This increases the value of defecting and the overall
deterrence e¤ect of the law enforcement policy. Taking these two e¤ects into account, we
then characterize the optimal law enforcement policy with leniency.
We …nd that an optimal leniency policy is restricted to the …rst party that reports.
Allowing more agents to obtain leniency makes the program more easily exploitable, since
then fewer agents must pay the full …ne each period; and it reduces the maximal reward
that can be o¤ered to the …rst agent that reports. The optimal policy also maximizes
…nes. High …nes are valuable not only because they reduce the expected value of collusive-
criminal relations, as in Becker (1968), but also because they allow to …nance higher rewards
for agents that self-report. Most importantly, we …nd that unless …nes are exogenously
constrained to be very small, the optimal policy o¤ers to the …rst reporting agent a reward
revised its eight-year-old leniency policy exactly to introduce this feature: complete, “automatic” exemption
from …nes for the …rst …rm that spontaneously self-report before an investigation is opened (European
Commission, 2002). The previous version, introduced in 1996, left substantial discretion to the Commission,
which may have scared potential applicants (no …rm spontaneously self-reported under the old scheme).
6According to Scott Hammond, Director of Criminal Enforcement of the DoJ Antitrust Division, about
50% of the leniency applications are now spontaneous reports falling within Section A of the Corporate
Leniency Policy (personal communication). Elsewhere, he claimed that “over the last …ve years, the Amnesty
Program has been responsible for detecting and prosecuting more antitrust violation than all of our [other
investigating tools]” (2001). Similar statements can be found in Spratling (1998, 1999).
4equal to the sum of all …nes paid by his former partners. Maximal rewards maximize the
deterrence e¤ect of the law enforcement policy.
Large …nes can …nance a large reward for the …rst reporting agent, and a su¢ciently
large reward would lead an agent to defect from any collusive/criminal agreement, report
and cash the reward. Since agents know this, when …nes and rewards are su¢ciently high
no agreement is sustainable and the optimal policy implements the …rst best, complete and
costless deterrence. Investigations by the law enforcing agency are then redundant, and
being costly, should be avoided. This is perhaps the most striking result of the paper.7 The
crucial ingredient behind it is the third among the earlier-mentioned distinctive features
of organized crime: the fact that others posses information on an agent’s crime. Leniency
elicits the information agents have on their partners, ensuring that a wrongdoer may have
to pay a …ne even when the probability of being directly detected by the law enforcement
agency is zero. We name “courageous” these optimal, “high powered” leniency policies
o¤ering rewards to the …rst reporting agent, as rewarding former wrongdoers is sometimes
regarded as immoral, even though the Bible suggests the very opposite.
Since political and institutional constraints may prevent o¤ering rewards, we go on to an-
alyze constrained-optimal “moderate” leniency programs, where reduced …nes are bounded
to be non-negative (rewards are excluded). Moderate leniency programs are “low powered”
incentive schemes, and as such they cannot achieve the …rst best. However, they are not
irrelevant with respect to deterrence, as it has sometimes been argued (even by who writes).
We identify two e¤ects ensuring that even moderate leniency programs restricted to the
…rst, spontaneously reporting party may make collusive/criminal agreements harder to sus-
tain. The …rst is a “protection from …nes” e¤ect, and is present when the reduced …nes of
the moderate leniency program are below the expected …ne of a defecting agent that does
not report. By increasing the expected payo¤ of an agent that defects and reports above
that of an agent that only defects, the moderate leniency program make collusive/criminal
agreements harder to sustain. The second is a “protection from punishment” e¤ect, present
when collusive/criminal agreements are sustained by two-phase punishment strategies and
repeated o¤enders are punished harder than …rst time ones. A report then raises …nes and
reduces expected pro…ts from further collusion, limiting the costs agents are willing to incur
to punish the agent that defected in the …rst place.
There is at least a third important reason why even moderate leniency programs may
have deterrence e¤ects. As often stressed by DoJ o¢cials, leniency may generate “break-
downs in trust” among wrongdoers, it may increase the perceived “riskiness” of collusion.
To capture this e¤ect, we introduce risk dominance considerations in the sense of John
Harsanyi and Reinhadt Selten (1988). Within a simpli…ed version of the model, we show that
even moderate leniency programs always strictly increase the riskiness of collusive/criminal
agreements. Moreover, we …nd that riskiness increases strictly more when eligibility to the
program is restricted to the …rst reporting party, o¤ering theoretical support to DoJ o¢cials’
claim that the …rst comer rule is crucial in generating breakdowns of trust in cartels, and
the consequent rushes to report. Optimal policies with respect to maximizing the riskiness
of collusive/criminal agreements are otherwise identical to those making agreements harder
7To our knowledge, it is the …rst time that the …rst best is achieved in a model of law enforcement á la
Becker.
5to sustain in equilibrium: they prescribe maximal …nes, and a maximal reward for the …rst
reporting agent.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We start with a short review of the
literature. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 derives the optimal law enforcement
policy in the absence of leniency programs. Section 4 analyzes how leniency programs a¤ect
sustainability of collusive/criminal agreements in equilibrium. Section 5 characterizes the
optimal law enforcement policy when rewards are feasible. Section 6 considers constrained-
optimal policies where leniency programs must be “moderate”. Section 7 characterizes the
e¤ects of leniency when agents care about strategic risk. Section 8 discusses robustness
issues and concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
1L i t e r a t u r e r e v i e w
Despite the prominence of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in economics and the importance
of organized crime in society, until very recently there was no economic investigation of the
e¤ects of leniency programs on cartels and organized crime.
The …rst paper addressing the e¤ects of leniency policy on cartels, to our knowledge,
is one by Massimo Motta and Michele Polo (2003). Their approach is complementary to
our. We look for the optimal design of law enforcement policies with leniency programs in a
model of crime deterrence á la Becker (1968), where detection and conviction are identi…ed
with a single probability and the cost of enforcement is a choice variable for the policy
maker. In this sense, we are mainly focusing on the optimal design and deterrence e¤ects
of Section A of the US Corporate Leniency Policy. Motta and Polo’s model is instead in
the spirit of the plea bargaining literature, with an exogenous cost of law enforcement and
with detection leading to conviction only with some probability. Their model is designed to
answer a speci…c question: whether …rms that report information when being already under
investigation should also be eligible to leniency. Their main focus, therefore, is on the value
of Section B of the Corporate Leniency Programs, and their central result is that it may
indeed increase deterrence by making prosecution more e¤ective, a result on which we fully
agree.
Besides in focus, our paper and Motta and Polo’s di¤er crucially in both assumptions
and results. These authors do not consider rewards nor strategic risk; they assume that …rms
sustain collusive agreements with ”grim trigger” strategies (we allow for generic punishment
strategies), and that a defecting …rm cannot be convicted for having taken part to a cartel,
nor can report information on former partners (we consider both these possibilities). Under
their simplifying assumptions – required to solve their more complex model – the “protection
from …nes” and the “protection from punishment” e¤ects do not emerge, and since risk
dominance issues are not considered a moderate leniency program appears unable to induce
agents to spontaneously self-report. This leads to their conclusions that to have any e¤ect a
leniency program must be open to …rms under investigation, that the same lenient treatment
should be o¤ered to all …rms independent of who reports …rst (under their assumptions
removing the “…rst comer rule” – the bene…t of being the …rst …rm to report – has no cost),
and that leniency programs are second-best (i.e. if the Antitrust Authority has su¢cient
resources to deter cartels through …nes and inspections it should not introduce any leniency
program).
6These conclusions con‡ict directly with our central result that an optimally designed
leniency program can deliver the …rst best, and with our other (Sections 6 and 7) results
that it is always optimal to have a leniency program, even if moderate, and that an optimal
leniency program restricts eligibility to the best treatment (rewards or full amnesty) to the
…rst …rm that reports, as done in reality.8 This contrast is due to the restrictive assumptions
Motta and Polo worked with. As we show, if agents can be convicted for past crimes and
can self-report when they defect, if they can use (optimal) two-phase punishment strategies,
or if they are susceptible to strategic risk considerations, even moderate leniency programs
have a direct deterrence e¤ects which would be just lost by o¤ering the same amount of
leniency to all reporting parties.
Our work is also closely related to a paper by Cecile Aubert, William Kovacic and Patrick
Rey (in progress). This paper was developed independently and simultaneously to our, and
also considers rewards in Antitrust enforcement, although in a model that – as far as we
know (the paper was not yet circulated) – shares most of Motta and Polo’s assumptions.
Aubert et al. focus on the interaction between the Individual and the Corporate Leniency
Policies, i.e. on the costs and bene…ts of creating an internal agency problem, a con‡ict of
interests between the …rm and individual employees, by allowing the latter to cash a reward
when reporting their own …rm’s misbehavior. They also consider the possibility of secret
reports. Rey (2001) o¤ers an excellent survey that discusses some of this paper’s results.
Giancarlo Spagnolo (2000) highlighted a potential drawback of current (moderate) le-
niency programs. It shows that when information is durable, with moderate leniency pro-
grams the threat of reporting the cartel to the Antitrust Authority in case of a defection
could be used to enforce collusion in occasional competitive situations like auctions. The
optimal schemes discussed in the present paper, though, would also solve that kind of prob-
lems.
Cristopher Ellis and Wesley Wilson (2002) developed a model of the current leniency
programs that o¤ers a new perspective. They show that a moderate leniency program may
induce …rms to report information in order to damage competitors and obtain a strategic
advantage. Their result, together with our, helps explain the rush of cartel breakdowns with
spontaneous reports that has taken place in the US these last years. However, these authors
also …nd that leniency programs may end up having the perverse e¤ect of stabilizing those
cartels that it could not deter, reinforcing the results in Spagnolo (2000).
Our paper builds on Becker (1968), therefore it is related to the economic literature on
optimal law enforcement stemming from that seminal contribution.9 Within this literature,
our paper is closest to the recent work on self-reporting. Focusing on individual wrongdoers
committing isolated crimes, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell (1994) have shown how re-
ducing sanctions against wrongdoers that spontaneously self-report lowers law enforcement
costs by reducing the number of wrongdoers to be detected. These authors also show that
8Motta and Polo’s conclusions also con‡ict with the statements of DoJ o¢cials arguing that treating better
the …rst reporting agent is crucial to the success ofthe leniency program; and are somewhat inconsistent with
the recent US experience, where 50% of leniency applications were spontaneous reports falling under Section
A of the Corporate Leniency Policy (we believe, though, that only part of these applications were really
spontaneous reports).
9Michael Polisky and Steven Shavell (2000) and Nuno Garoupa (1997) o¤er encompassing overviews of
this literature.
7when agents are risk averse, o¤ering leniency to wrongdoers that self-report increases wel-
fare by reducing the overall risk agents bear. Both these insights apply to leniency policies
in general. Relatedly, Arun Malik (1993) discusses the role of self-reporting in reducing
auditing costs in environmental regulation; while Innes (1999a,b) highlights the value of the
early remediation of damages that …ne reductions for self-reporting wrongdoers allow for.
These papers highlight important bene…ts that a lenient treatment of self-reporting agents
may bring about, but none of them considers its peculiar ability to elicit information and
undermine trust in cartels and organized crime.
We are not the …rst to discuss organized crime from an economic point of view. Polo
(1995) and Diego Gambetta and Peter Reuter (1995) already noted that criminal organi-
zations su¤er of internal enforcement problems; Kai Konrad and Stergios Skaperdas (1997,
1998) emphasized the role of reputational forces and credible threats in making contracts in
the criminal world self-enforcing; and Garoupa (2000) emphasized the vertical-hierarchical
aspect of criminal organizations and its e¤ect on optimal law enforcement. None of these
papers, though, discuss why and how leniency policies may be used to deter organized crime.
2 The model
Let there be an economy with many oligopolistic industries – or a society with many potential
criminal organizations – each of which can be represented by a discounted in…nitely repeated
(oligopolistic or criminal) game between a number of risk neutral agents. Let there also be a
benevolent Legislator who – having forbidden welfare–reducing collusive/criminal behavior
– sets the parameters of the law enforcement policy. We assume that the Legislator sets and
commits to law enforcement policy parameters …rst. Then, having observed those policy
choices, agents interact in the oligopolistic (criminal) supergame.
TIMING
² Step 1: The Legislator commits to law enforcement policy parameters
² Step 2: Agents observe the policy parameters and start interacting
2.1 Cartels/organized crime
We will focus on industries where the exercise of collusive market power generates deadweight
welfare losses that dominate any potential dynamic gain, and on criminal organizations that
produce net social losses.10 A representative industry (potential criminal organizations) i
consists of N ¸ 2 symmetric …rms (agents) interacting repeatedly in the in…nite, discrete
time denoted by t =1 ;2:::, and discounting future through the common factor ±i; with
0 <± i < 1.
We assume there is a continuum of industries (potential criminal organizations) that
di¤er only with respect to agents’ discount factor ±i; and that can be ordered one a line
10This means that if law enforcement was costless complete crime/cartel deterrence would be optimal. In
classical models of optimal law enforcement, optimal deterrence may be partial even when law enforcement
is costless (see e.g. Polinsky and Shavell, 2000). This is because cases are included where the bene…t from
a crime exceeds the harm it causes, so that from a purely utilitarian perspective the crime should not be
deterred.
8with uniform density with respect to the such factor ±i 2 [±min;±max]: We also assume that
agents in all industries (potential criminal organization) use the same strategies to support
collusive agreements, and that the stage game – the static oligopolistic (criminal) interaction
– has at least a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, with ¼n denoting agents’ lowest payo¤ from
a static equilibrium.
Remark 1 For expositional convenience, in the remainder of the paper we will phrase our
discussion mainly in terms of a collusive agreement between oligopolistic …rms. However,
the reader should keep in mind that all reasoning and results directly apply to the other forms
of organized crime discussed in the introduction.11
In the absence of law enforcement, …rms can sustain a stationary collusive agreement
in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if the value of sticking to the agreement – the dis-
counted sum of expected payo¤s from respecting the agreement V c
i – exceeds the value V d
i
of defecting unilaterally and then being subject to the punishment phase that disciplines the






>¼ d + ±iV
p
i (= V d
i );
or, normalized by (1 ¡ ±i),
¼c > (1 ¡ ±i)¼d + ±ivp; (1)
where ¼c denotes a …rm’s static payo¤ from sticking to the collusive agreement; ¼d that from
unilaterally deviating from the agreement and choosing the static best response (of course
¼d >¼ c >¼ n); V
p
i denotes the discounted sum of payo¤s expected at the beginning of the
punishment phase following a …rm’s unilateral defection; and vp denotes the time-average
payo¤ a …rm that defected unilaterally earns after the defection, so that vp =( 1¡ ±i)V
p
i
(the superscript p is for “punished”).13 Of course it must be vp <¼ c <¼ d; since to enforce
collusion cartel members must penalize defecting ones in one way or another. Finally, ¼b
will denote the payo¤ a colluding …rm obtains when one of its partners defects unilaterally,
where ¼b <¼ n <¼ c <¼ d:
We try keep as general as possible by not specifying particular punishment strategies.
Speci…c punishment strategies will be discussed when they are important for a result. Since
we want to understand the e¤ects of leniency programs on deterrence, in these occasions
11To translate the results we obtain for cartels into correspondent results for other forms of organized
crime, it is su¢cient to reinterpret variables. For example, for corruption, the number of players N will
typically be two, say a …rm and a bureaucrat; collusive pro…ts ¼
c can be reinterpreted as the gains from a
complete collusive transaction; pro…ts from a unilateral deviation ¼
d can be reinterpreted as a party’s gains
from cheating in the collusive transaction; and so on.
12We will focus on a given agreement that can be thought of as the most pro…table one, such as the joint
monopoly collusive agreement in case of oligopoly. An interesting extension of this paper would be to specify




i will always be used for the discounted sum of payo¤s expected in industry i by an agent
in phase x,a n ds m a l lv
x for the corresponding time-average per period payo¤ v
x =( 1¡ ±i)V
x
y ,w h i c hi s
independent from the discount factor.
9we will assume that agents choose punishment strategies optimally: we will focus on collu-
sive/criminal arrangements enforced by “optimal penal codes” which discipline defections
with the strongest available punishment (Dilip Abreu, 1988). When these optimal arrange-
ments are deterred, any other collusive/criminal agreement will also be deterred.
2.2 Information
We assume that each period a cartel is active a piece of “hard” evidence is generated, inde-
pendent of whether a defection from collusive strategies occurs.14 We can think to each stage
game of the dynamic game as being composed of two substages: in the …rst cartel members
communicate – e.g. to con…rm/update collusive strategies – generating hard information;
in the second they set the relevant market variables (price, output, investments...).15
For simplicity, we assume that all cartel members possess part of the hard evidence
produced by the cartel and can costlessly transmit it to third parties if they wish; that if
an agent reports the hard evidence it possesses to the law enforcing agency the cartel is
convicted with probability one; and that there is “full information decay” in the sense that
all hard information on a cartel active at time t vanishes at time t +1 .I t w i l l b e c o m e
clear that the qualitative results of the paper do not depend on any of these simplifying
assumptions.
Finally, we limit attention to the case of public information revelation by assuming that
when a …rm reports its hard information to the law enforcing agency, its report becomes
public information at the end of the period (to obtain the conviction of a cartel prosecutors
must usually disclose available information and its sources to courts and defendants).16
2.3 Law enforcement
The Legislator can set the following parameters of the law enforcement policy, within limits
dependant on exogenous (e.g. political) factors:
1. A monetary …ne F; with F 2 [F;F], that a colluding …rm or a member of the criminal
organization has to pay if convicted for the …rst time;
2. A …ne Fr that a repeated (or recidivous) o¤ender – a …rm already convicted in the past




3. A reduced …ne RF (“reward” when RF < 0), with RF 2 [RF;F], that a cartel member
c a np a y / c a s hi n s t e a do fF if – when it is not under investigation – it spontaneously
reveals information to the law enforcement agency, allowing it to convict its partners;
4. The probability ® b yw h i c hc a r t e lm e m b e r sa r ed i s c o v e r e da n dc o n v i c t e di nap e r i o d
in which everybody conforms to agreed collusive strategies;
14A previous version of this paper assumed that evidence is produced only if no defection occurs, as in
Motta and Polo (1999). The current assumption is more realistic, since in reality undercutting ones’ cartel is
no guarantee not be convicted for past collusive activities. In addition, this assumption allows us to model
the e¤ects of leniency programs on the “riskiness” of collusion.
15This timing for the stage game is suggested by Rey (2001, p. 17), and re‡ects well the behaviour of real
world cartels, whose members meet regularly to monitor and update their agreement.
16The case of secret reports is considered in Aubert et al.(in progress) and Rey (2001).
105. The probability ¯ by which a cartel member that conforms to agreed collusive strate-
gies is convicted in a period when another member unilaterally defects;
6. The probability ° by which a unilaterally defecting cartel member is convicted; we
assume this can happen only if non defecting members are also convicted, so that
¯>°(one could realistically assume ¯ = ° + ´,w i t h´ ¸ 0):
We restrict focus on realistic parameter con…gurations by assuming ®;¯;° < 1
2: In the
tradition of Becker (1968), we also assume that administering …nes is costless, so that these
can be regarded as welfare-neutral transfers, but that increasing each of the conviction
probabilities is costly. We let ck(k); with k 2f ®;¯;°g; denote the (social) cost functions of
implementing such probabilities, and assume ck(0) = 0;c 0
k(k) ¸ 0;c 00
k(:) > 0 and, to simplify
some statements, c0
k(0) = 0:
As for rewards (negative RF), were they …nanced through taxation it would of course
be reasonable to assume them costly to administer. However, in this paper we will consider
exclusively self-…nancing leniency programs, de…ned as follows.
De…nition 1 A leniency program is self-…nancing when the sum of rewards it pays to re-
porting agents (if any) is weakly smaller than the sum of the …nes paid by other agents




F for each cartel i.
Therefore, as positive …nes, rewards (negative …nes) will also be assumed costless to
administer.17 We will see that focusing on self-…nancing leniency programs is not restrictive,
since self-…nancing constraints (upper bounds on rewards) emerge endogenously in the search
for globally optimal programs to avoid having agents colluding and reporting just to cash
rewards. It will also become clear that the basic framework sketched in this section can be
complicated in many ways without qualitatively a¤ecting results.18
3 Optimal law enforcement without leniency
Consider a representative industry i when no leniency program is present, so that RF = F:
Let V cr
i denote the discounted payo¤ expected by a member of a convicted cartel who did
not defect the period after being convicted, and vcr the correspondent time-average payo¤,
with V cr
i (1 ¡ ±i)=vcr (the superscript c is for “cooperator” and r for “recidivous”). Of
course vcr is a function of …rms’ strategies and of the legal system. By sticking to agreed


















1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)±i
=
¼c ¡ ®F + ®±iV cr
i
1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)±i
;
17Adding other (moral?) costs of rewarding a wrongdoer that reports would complicate exposition, reduce
the set of parameter con…gurations where a reward is optimal, but otherwise leave all qualitative conclusions
unchanged.
18For example, non-monetary and …t-the-crime sanctions can easily be accommodated by the model,
without substantial changes in results.
11which is decreasing in ®, F and (weakly) in Fr:19
Discounted expected payo¤s from defecting depend on the probability ¯ by which the
cartel is convicted a period in which a defection takes place, and on the probability ° that
the defecting …rm is itself convicted. The value of defecting from collusive strategies is
V d
i = ¼d ¡ °F +
±i(¯vpr +( 1¡ ¯)vp)
1 ¡ ±i
;
where vpr denotes the time-average pro…t expected by a cartel member after he unilaterally
defected and the cartel was convicted (with or without him; again the superscript r is
for “repeated” or “recidivous” and V
pr
i (1 ¡ ±i)=vpr). It can be vpr 6= vp because cartel
members never convicted will pay F if caught colluding again after the defection, while cartel
members already convicted will pay Fr.( I fFr = F it will obviously be vpr = vp). Similarly,
if one assumes that collusive/criminal agreements are disciplined by “grim trigger” strategies
(Friedman, 1971) – such that if a defection occurs all agents start playing the worse static
Nash equilibrium forever – it is vpr = vp = ¼n and @vh
@Fk =0for h 2f p;prg and k 2f r;0g:
However, if Fr >Fand agents use other (optimal) punishment strategies than grim trigger,
expected gains from collusion will be lower for repeated o¤enders. For example, when the
agreements are enforced by two-phase punishments à la Abreu (1986) – where all agents
conform to a costly “stick” phase (e.g. a tough market war) because of the “carrot” of a
subsequent return to collusion – by reducing expected gains from collusion (the carrot) a
higher Fr softens the stick players can credibly threaten against a defector. In this case it
will be @vpr
@Fr > 0 and vpr >v p. A similar argument applies to the relation between F and
vp; so that when agents adopt such strategies it is @vp
@F > 0:20
Remark 2 Since it can be @vp
@F < 0; @vpr
@Fr < 0 and vpr <v p only when players use suboptimal
punishment strategies, in the remainder of the paper we will focus on the case @vp
@F ¸ 0;
@vpr
@Fr ¸ 0 and vpr ¸ vp:
Wrapping up, …rms can sustain a collusive/criminal agreement in subgame perfect Nash






1 ¡ ±i(1 ¡ ®)
>¼ d
i ¡ °F +




Studying this condition leads to the …rst, benchmark results.
Lemma 1 Suppose there is no leniency program (RF = F). Then:
19The value of colluding is decreasing in F
r because stronger …nes for recidive wrongdoers reduce payo¤s
v
cr expected after being caught (
@vcr








c) ¡ (1 ¡ ±)F
[1 ¡ ±(1 ¡ ®)]
2 ;
negative as long as ±(v
cr ¡ ¼
c) < (1 ¡ ±)F; w h i c hi ss a t i s … e ds i n c ev
cr <¼
c.
20Analogous arguments apply when agents enforce collusive/criminal agreements by asymmetric (weakly)
renegotiation-proof punishments of the kind discussed by Joe Farrell and Eric Maskin (1989).
121. When F and Fr can be set independently, the ex ante optimal …nes are:





@F ; and F¤ =0otherwise;
ii) Fr¤ = Fr.
2. When F and Fr are restricted to be equal, the ex ante optimal …ne is:




@Fr; and F¤ =0otherwise:
The Lemma appears complex because we have kept everything as general as possible,
but its interpretation is quite straightforward. Statements 1) and 2) are the organized
crime version of Becker’s (1968) celebrated result that for individual, isolated crimes the
Legislator should set …nes at their maximum to save on investigation costs. As one would
have expected, with dynamic multiagent criminal relations things are slightly more complex
than in Becker’s single agent, occasional crime framework, hence the Lemma o¤ers additional
insights.
Statement 1i) gives the condition under which raising …nes for …rst-time o¤enders, cae-
teris paribus, deters (or facilitates) collusion between never-convicted o¤enders. It says that
increasing …nes F for …rst time o¤enders, holding …xed other parameters of the law en-
forcement policy (Fr included), increases deterrence as long as the probability ® of being
convicted while colluding is not substantially smaller than the probability ° of being con-
victed when defecting unilaterally from collusive strategies. In this case the …ne should be
s e ta ti t sm a x i m u m . 21 However, if a unilateral defection increases the probability to be
caught by the law enforcing agency (°>® ), say because the defection signals the existence
of a cartel, a Becker-like result does not obtain: then an increase in …nes deters defections
from a cartel, rather than the cartel itself. By deterring defections, an increase in …nes
ends up facilitating collusion. Statement 1ii) says that to maximize ex ante deterrence of
…rst-time collusion it is optimal to set …nes against repeated o¤enders maximal. Statement
2 shows that also when F and Fr are restricted to be equal again it is optimal to maximize
…nes only if ° is su¢ciently low. Lemma 1 directly leads to the …rst, benchmark proposition.
Proposition 1 Absent leniency programs (i.e. with RF = F) an optimal law enforcement
policy sets ° =0 ;F= F¤; and Fr = Fr¤:
Absent Leniency Programs, the Legislator maximizes welfare by setting ° =0 : This
result is not directly related to Becker’s work, it is an insight speci…c to our dynamic
multiagent framework. Welfare increases when (2) is more stringent (more cartels/crime
are deterred), and as long as there is law enforcement (F>0) any increase in ° makes (2)
less stringent by discouraging unilateral defections from collusive behavior. Since increasing
° is costly, the optimal policy is to set ° =0 : In practice, the law enforcement agency should
carefully avoid prosecuting cartel members who unilaterally defected from collusive strategies,
and should make this policy of public domain. A reputation for forgiving cartel members
that unilaterally defect destabilizes cartels by encouraging further defections, while at the
21We believe this case, and in particular the case ®>° ;to be the most relevant in reality (also because,
as we argue below, it is optimal for the Legislator to keep ° low). In the next sections we will focus mainly
on this ”regular” case, where Becker’s result applies.
13same time saving on law enforcement costs.22 And when ° is optimally set at zero Becker’s
(1968) logic applies: by Lemma 1, …nes should then be maximal.
To better focus on the e¤ects of the Leniency Program, in the remainder of the paper
we will restrict attention to the most realistic case where °<®(so that maximal …nes
are optimal), and assume that the Legislator optimally sets F = F¤ and Fr = Fr¤ (the
optimality of this choice in this model is not a¤ected by changes in RF).
4 The E¤ects of Leniency
We now let the Legislator introduce a leniency program by choosing a reduced …ne RF < F
for colluding …rms that report hard information su¢cient to convict “the rest of the gang”.
The analysis will focus on the two most important dimensions of leniency programs: the
eligibility criteria, i.e. whether all reporting …rms or only the …rst one to report should
obtain leniency; and the size of the reduced sanction/reward RF:
Absent Leniency Programs, reporting information was always a strictly dominated ac-
tion, since it led to the payment of the full sanction F. With a Leniency Program agents
may instead …nd it convenient to report information on the cartel, and this may change both
the value of colluding V c
i a n dt h a to fd e f e c t i n gV d
i . To characterize the optimal program we
must understand how leniency a¤ects V c
i and V d
i .
4.1 “Exploitable” leniency programs
Consider …rst the e¤ects of a leniency program on the value of colluding. The value V c
i may
change because when the leniency program is su¢ciently generous, colluding agents may
…nd it convenient to consensually report their collusive/criminal behavior each period, to
avoid facing the risk of being detected and …ned by the law enforcing agency. When this is
the case we will say that the leniency program is “exploitable”, in the sense that agents can
use it to reduce the expected cost of misbehavior. Let V c0
i denote the value of following the
strategy pro…le that prescribes …rms to both collude and report their collusive agreement in
each period.
De…nition 2 A leniency program is “exploitable” in industry i when it allows …rms to
increase the value of a collusive/criminal agreement by reporting it each period to the law
enforcing agency (when V c0
i >Vc
i ).
We assume that when the leniency program restricts eligibility to the …rst reporting
…rm only and agents agree to collude and report, either they report simultaneously – so
that the reduced …ne is allocated randomly – or they take turns to report and each period
reallocate the di¤erence between reduced and full …ne among cartel members. Under either




Clearly, …rms will choose to collude and report only when the leniency program is ex-
ploitable, so that V c0
i >V c
i . Since colluding agents can always choose not to report, the
22Conversely, the worst thing the law enforcement agency can do is looking at unilateral defections and
price wars as signals of collusive/criminal behavior and target all cartel members. This policy would stabilze
cartels, as a unilateral defection would then not only be punished by partners; it would also increase the
probability of being …ned for past collusive behavior.
14value of colluding cannot decrease with the introduction of a leniency program, it will be
maxfV c
i ;Vc0
i g: It remains to be checked under which circumstances it is V c0
i >Vc
i ,s ot h a t
the leniency program can be exploited. The following lemma characterizes such circum-
stances.
Lemma 2 Suppose all reporting agents are eligible to leniency. Then:
1. When Fr = F, the leniency program is exploitable if RF < ®F;
2. When Fr >F, the leniency program is exploitable if RF < ®F + ®2±i
Fr¡F
1¡±i :
Suppose only the …rst reporting agent is eligible to leniency. Then:
3. When Fr = F, the leniency program is exploitable if RF < ®F ¡ (N ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ®)F;
4. When Fr >F, the leniency program is exploitable if




Comparing statements 1-2 with 3-4 one sees that restricting eligibility to the …rst …rm
that reports reduces the set of exploitable leniency programs; it restricts the range of re-
duced …nes/rewards that increase the value of colluding. This is of course the case because
restricting eligibility to one …rm implies that each time …rms both collude and report, all but
one …rms must pay the full …ne. Therefore, all else equal, …nes’ reductions/rewards must be
much larger for a restricted leniency program to become exploitable than for an unrestricted
one. In the relevant parameter con…guration (®<1
2) restricting eligibility allows to reward
reporting agents – the more generously the smaller ® and the larger N – without making the
program exploitable. On the contrary, unrestricted programs become exploitable already
when the reduced …ne equals or falls below the expected …ne.
Comparing Lemma 2’s statements 1 and 2 one sees that when eligibility is not re-
stricted, the range of exploitable leniency programs is larger when the expected …nes for
repeated/recidivous o¤enders are higher. This is because leniency programs do not distin-
guish between …rst time and repeated o¤enders, and reducing all …nes to RF they undo
the increase in post-conviction deterrence linked to the higher …nes for repeated o¤enders.
Finally, comparing statements 3 and 4 one sees that with restricted eligibility, for the inter-
esting range of parameters (®<1
2)a n dN not too small, the range of exploitable leniency
programs is smaller when the expected …nes for a repeated/recidivous o¤ender are higher.
Then even when agents collude and report, after the …rst period agents face the increased
sanctions for recidivous o¤enders.
4.2 “E¤ective” leniency programs
We now turn to the e¤ects of a Leniency Program on the value of unilaterally defecting
from collusive strategies. Let V d0
i denote the value of defecting and simultaneously reporting
information to the law enforcing agency. The natural assumption we adopt here is that if
an agent decides to both defect unilaterally from collusive strategies and report, he will be
able to report …rst even when collusive strategies already prescribe …rms to report (in turn
or simultaneously) along the equilibrium path.
15The value of defecting cannot decrease with the introduction of the leniency program,






since when V d0
i <Vd
i a defecting agent can always choose not to
report. And of course as long as V d0
i <Vd
i the leniency program cannot be “e¤ective” in
terms of increasing agents’ temptation to unilaterally defect and report.
De…nition 3 A leniency program is “e¤ective” in industry i when it allows a …rm that




The next lemma characterizes the circumstances under which the value of defecting
increases with the introduction of the leniency program.
Lemma 3 Independent of how many …rms are eligible to leniency:
1. When Fr = F, the leniency program is e¤ective if RF < °F;
2. When Fr >F, the leniency program is e¤ective if RF < °F +
±i(1¡¯)
1¡±i (vpr ¡ vp):
Lemma 3 tells us that – in our model – there are two ways in which the leniency program
may be e¤ective in deterring cartels crime by increasing the value of defecting from an illegal
agreement. First, the leniency program protects an agent that defects and reports from the
expected …ne °F he would otherwise face when defecting. When repeated o¤enders are not
subject to higher …nes (Fr
i = Fi), only this protection from …nes e¤ect is at work, and a
leniency program increases the value of defecting (and reporting) if the reduced …ne RF
is smaller than the expected …ne °F.W h e nr e p e a t e do ¤ e n d e r sa r es u b j e c tt oh i g h e r… n e s
(Fr
i >F i) and collusive agreements are sustained by optimal two-phase punishments, a
second e¤ect enters the scene. Firms are then willing to bear the costs of a short, harsh
punishment phase – say a tough price war – because they expect to go back to collusion
right after it. By reporting under the leniency program a defecting …rm ensures that the
cartel is convicted, and that thereafter further collusion is punished with the higher …nes
Fr. This reduces the expected pro…ts from further collusion vcr, and the costs …rms are
willing to incur to punish the initial defection. We name this protection from punishment
e¤ect: by reporting under the leniency program a defecting …rm reduces future collusive
pro…ts, thereby softening the punishment it faces for its defection (getting vpr instead of vp
after the defection, where vpr >v p).
5 “Courageous” leniency programs
In this section we use the results just derived to characterize (unconstrained) optimal le-
niency programs. Unconstrained optimal programs can be labelled “courageous” because it
turns out that – for realistic parameters con…gurations – they prescribe that a substantial
reward should be paid to the …rst agent that reports information to the law enforcing agency.
In contrast, leniency programs implemented in reality are often “moderate”, in the sense that
they only reduce, or at best cancel sanctions for reporting …rms. Such constrained-optimal
moderate programs will be discussed in Section 6.
165.1 Optimal eligibility
Given other parameters of the law enforcement policy, an optimal leniency program trades o¤














more stringent thereby increasing the minimum discount factor at which collusion can be
sustained (hence reducing the set of industries where collusion is feasible).
We assumed that administering …nes and rewards is costless, so that reducing the …nes
imposed and increasing the rewards paid by extending eligibility to all reporting …rms cannot
increase welfare.
Contrasting Lemma 2’s statements 1-2 with 3-4 we have seen that restricting eligibility to
the …rst …rm that reports reduces the set of ‘exploitable’ leniency programs, enlarging the set
of …ne discounts/rewards that can be awarded without increasing the value of colluding. On
the other hand, from Lemma 3 we know that the attractiveness of defecting and reporting is
independent of the eligibility criteria, it only depends on the size of the …ne discount/reward.
Therefore, restricting eligibility to the …rst reporting …rm allows to increase the right hand
side of condition (IC) by awarding larger …ne discounts/rewards, while leaving the left hand
side of (IC) unchanged (i.e. without a¤ecting the value of colluding). This conclusion can
be restated as follows.
Proposition 2 An optimal leniency program is restricted to the …rst reporting agent.
In our model there are no gains from extending eligibility to leniency beyond the …rst
reporting …rm, while doing it constrains the size of the …ne discount/reward that can be
awarded to induce a cartel member to report. The result appears consistent with how real
world leniency programs are designed, i.e. with a large di¤erence between the amount of
leniency obtainable by the …rst reporting party (automatic complete amnesty) and that
available to further reporting parties (discretional, partial reductions of sanctions).23
There is a further reason to restrict eligibility to amnesty to the …rst reporting party,
not yet captured by our model but often stressed by DoJ o¢cials, who see it as crucial to
the e¤ectiveness of the program. In reality, the …rst comer restriction appears to generate
“races to report” caused by the “fear to arrive second”. Were the second, third or forth
reporting …rms eligible to the same treatment as the …rst one such races would arguably
not occur. Then …rms could safely adopt a ‘wait and see’ strategy (“do not report …rst, be
ready to report if somebody else does it”). We will try to capture this e¤ect in Section 7,
where we introduce strategic risk considerations.
Since we are interested in optimal leniency programs, the remainder of the paper will
focus on programs restricted to the …rst reporting party (unless otherwise speci…ed). For
these programs, the self-…nancing constraint implies RF ¸ RF = ¡(N ¡ 1)F:
23A smaller …ne discount for the second reporting …rm would become optimal in our model if we relaxed
the (standard) assumption that if a …rm reports the cartel is convicted with probability one, and assumed
that a second report would increase the probability of conviction. Such an extension, however, would increase
complexity and length of the paper without a¤ecting any of its central results, so it is left to future work.
175.2 Optimal …ne reductions/rewards
Our characterization of the optimal reduced …ne/reward RF¤ will focus on two cases. The
…rst is the case considered in all the related literature, with F = Fr = F (no increase in
sanctions for recidivous o¤enders) and agreements enforced by grim trigger strategies; so
that vcr = ¼c and vp = vpr = ¼n: The second case allows punishment strategies to be tougher
than grim trigger ones, so that vp <¼ n, and …nes for recidivous o¤enders to be “large”, so
that after being convicted collusion becomes too risky and vpr = vcr = ¼n: These two cases
are su¢cient to highlight all e¤ects at play, and can be fully characterized at the current
level of generality. Determining the exact RF¤ in intermediate cases requires specifying both
the underlying stage game and the punishment strategies to calculate @vp=@RF. Though,
there would be little gain to compensate for the loss of generality: it is easy to verify that
RF¤ would always be included between the levels obtained in the two cases we analyze, so
that the conclusions derived for these cases apply to intermediate cases as well.
Assuming that when agents are indi¤erent between reporting and not reporting they
choose to report, one can state the following.
Proposition 3 When F = Fr and vp = ¼n; the optimal leniency program (is restricted to
the …rst reporting party and) has
(
RF¤ = ®F ¡ (N ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ®)F when F>¼ c ¡ ¼n ¡ ¼d¡¼c
N¡1 ;
RF ¤ = RF = ¡(N ¡ 1)F otherwise.
When F<F r and vp <¼ n = vpr the optimal leniency program has RF¤ = RF.
This result stands to leniency programs as Becker’s (1968) result that optimal …nes
should be maximal stands to classical law enforcement models.
First, note that in all cases the optimal leniency program establishes a positive reward for
the …rst …rm that reports information on its cartel. The intuition is of course that rewards
improve the e¤ectivity of leniency programs and cartel deterrence by increasing …rms’ gains
from defecting from the collusive agreement and reporting it to the law enforcing agency
(the right hand side of condition IC). Of course, too high rewards may make the program
exploitable, hence the optimal reward may be smaller than the level at which the self-
…nancing constraint binds. This is what happens in the …rst case, where F = Fr and
vp = ¼n,a sl o n ga s… n e sa r en o tv e r ys m a l l( a sl o n ga st h e ya r ec l o s et oo rl a r g e rt h a nt h e
per-period collusive markup). Then the optimal reward is the minimum one that makes
the program exploitable (identi…ed by Lemma 2) leaving colluding …rms indi¤erent between
reporting and not reporting (V c0
i = V c
i ; …rms then report by our tie-breaking assumption).
It is optimal that they report since this allows to save on inspection costs c®(®).I ti sn o t
optimal to increase the reward further because it would increase the program’s exploitability
(V c0
i ) more than its e¤ectivity (V d0
i ), thereby reducing deterrence. When …nes are smaller
than the per-period’s collusive markup, increasing the reward above (decreasing RF below)
the level where the program becomes exploitable increases deterrence, as the increase in
e¤ectivity dominates on the increase in exploitability, and it is optimal to set the reward
maximal. In the second case, where the higher …nes for repeated o¤enders Fr >Fensure
that agents cannot sustain collusion after being convicted, agents cannot exploit the program
(by colluding and reporting) for more than one period. Then e¤ectivity considerations
dominate, and the optimal reward is again the maximal one.
18A second thing to note is that in the …rst case, where …nes are not very small, the
optimal reward is decreasing in the detection probability ®.T h i sm e a n st h a tinvestigations
and rewards are substitute law enforcement instruments.W h e n® is large, the optimal reward
must be small because a high probability of paying …nes when not reporting makes even
moderate rewards for reporting attractive and leniency programs exploitable. The optimal
self-…nancing reward is instead in all cases increasing in …nes, so that …nes and rewards
are complement instruments. Independent of the inspection probability, heavy …nes are
good because they allow to award and …nance larger rewards without making the leniency
program exploitable.
Finally, note that RF¤ is increasing in the number of agents involved. More agents make
a program (restricted to the …rst applicant) less exploitable: more …nes have to be paid and
in more parts must the reward be split when agents choose to collude and report.
5.3 Optimal law enforcement: achieving the …rst best
Let us now come to law enforcement policy. Since investigations and rewards are substitutes,
investigations cost c®(®) while self-…nancing rewards are costless, an optimal law enforce-
ment policy should rely as much as possible on self-…nancing rewards. In fact, we easily
obtain the following.
Proposition 4 There exists a …nite level of …nes F0 such that when F0 · F the optimal
law enforcement policy achieves the …rst best – complete and costless deterrence – with
° = ¯ = ® =0 ;F 0 · F · F; and ¡(N ¡ 1)F · RF ·¡ (N ¡ 1)F0.
This is a simple but remarkable result. It tells us that there is a …nite level of …nes
that – if politically feasible – allows to completely deter collusion in all industries and at
no cost. This is done by setting the reward for the …rst reporting agent equal to the sum
of the …nes paid by his former partners, interrupting all forms of costly investigations and
laying back on the chair waiting for wrongdoers to come forward with information. In other
words, in this model the combination of su¢ciently high …nes and optimally designed, high
powered leniency programs make the public enforcement of law – the active investigation of
organized crime – redundant, and actually suboptimal.
The result is also remarkable because, to our knowledge, it is the …rst time that the …rst
best is achieved in a law enforcement model ál aBecker (1968).24 Most previous work on
optimal law enforcement focused on individual crimes – where nobody has freely available
information on the crime besides the criminal – and shares the property of Becker’s original
model where even in…nite …nes cannot achieve the …rst best. A strictly positive probability
of detection is necessary for law enforcement to have any e¤ect, and the investigation costs
that generate such positive probability are a deadweight loss that keeps society away from
the …rst best. In these models complete deterrence is generally not optimal: the optimal
positive amount of residual, undeterred crime equalizes marginal social bene…ts and costs
of deterrence.
24Of course there will be costs linked to the court system, who has to evaluate/verify the information
reported. These veri…cation costs are usually disregarded in the law and economics literature stemming from
Becker (1968), they are considered unavoidable. These costs would be present with and without a leniency
program.
19On the contrary, in the present, organized crime framework fellows wrongdoers possess
information on each other’s crime. A su¢ciently high, …nite reward – …nanced by the
su¢ciently high, …nite …nes the reward generates – can elicit such information. Since self-
…nancing rewards are costless transfers for society, as are Becker’s …nes, complete deterrence
is then optimal and achieved at no cost. Of course, the sharpness of this result is partly
due to the relative simplicity of the model. As happened to Becker’s conclusion that …nes
should always be set maximal, our result can probably be softened by complicating the
model introducing other aspects of reality. Still, as Becker’s result, Propositions 3 and
4 establish a benchmark for future work on the optimal design of deterrence mechanisms
against cartels and organized crime.
6 Constrained-optimal leniency programs
Exogenous political and institutional factors may constrain the design of the law enforcement
policy. The most obvious way in which the design is usually constrained is in the size
of …nes and of …ne discounts/rewards. In this section we consider the optimal design of
the law enforcement policy when institutional restrictions on the size of …nes and of …ne
discounts/rewards are binding.
6.1 Constraints on …nes
When exogenous factors constrain …nes to be smaller than the level that leads to the …rst
best (F<F 0), as appears to be the case in many countries (particularly in the EU), the
second best law enforcement policy implies positive investigation costs and may imply a
non maximal reward. The next proposition characterizes the second best law enforcement
policy when the upper bound on …nes is binding.
Proposition 5 When the …rst best cannot be achieved because of a too low upper bound on
…nes (F<F 0), the optimal law enforcing policy has ° =0 ;F= F; Fr = F
r;R F= RF¤
and:
1. ®>0 a n ds u c ht h a tc0
®(®) equals the marginal social bene…t of deterrence, when
F = Fr, vp = ¼n and F>¼ c ¡ ¼n ¡ ¼d¡¼c
N¡1 ;
2. ® =0 ; when F = Fr, vp = ¼n and F<¼ c ¡ ¼n ¡ ¼d¡¼c
N¡1 ;
3. ®>0 a n ds u c ht h a tc0
®(®) equals the marginal social bene…t of deterrence, when
Fr >F and vcr = ¼n.
The proposition tells us that when maximal …nes are too small to achieve the …rst best
through self-…nancing rewards, it may be optimal to couple rewards with active investiga-
tions (statements 1 and 3). Note that in the …rst case – where F = Fr, vp = ¼n and …nes
are not too small – investigations and rewards are substitute instruments, so that since
the second best implies a positive ®; it also implies less than maximal rewards (statement
1). Only in the less plausible case where F = Fr, vp = ¼n and …nes are smaller than the
per-period collusive markup it is never optimal to investigate (statement 2).
206.2 Constraints on rewards: “moderate” leniency programs
O¤ering rewards to wrongdoers that cooperate with prosecutors against their former part-
ners is a consolidated practice in the US (see the discussion of misreporting in Section 8).
However, all codi…ed leniency programs we are aware of are “moderate”, in the sense that
they do not explicitly allow to reward a wrongdoer that reports information and cooperates
with the law enforcing agency. They only allow to reduce, or at best cancel sanctions against
agents that spontaneously self-report. For this reason in this section we consider the opti-
mal design of moderate leniency programs, constrained to non-negative reduced sanctions
for wrongdoers who self report (the optimization is constrained by RF ¸ RF =0 ); and in
the next section we consider their deterrence e¤ects.
The following proposition characterizes the optimal moderate leniency programs and the
correspondent optimal law enforcement policy.
Proposition 6 Suppose leniency programs are constrained to be moderate (RF =0 ). Then:
1. The constrained-optimal leniency program is restricted to the …rst reporting party and
has RF¤¤ =m a xfRF¤;0g; where RF¤ is de…ned in Proposition 3;
2. The optimal law enforcement policy has ° =0 ;F= F; Fr = F
r;R F= RF¤¤ and
®>0 a n ds u c ht h a tc0
®(®) equals the marginal social bene…t of deterrence.
The …rst statement obtains because the reasoning behind Propositions 2 and Proposition
3 continues to apply when the leniency programs are constrained to non-negative reduced
…nes (not to pay rewards). The constraint simply determines a corner solution (RF =0 )
whenever the unconstrained optimal leniency program would require a reward. Since in the
relevant parameter space (®<1
2)i ti sRF¤ < 0; in this region it will be RF¤¤ =0 .T h e
second part tells us that, as expected, with a moderate leniency program it will be generally
optimal to spend resources to actively investigate cartels.
6.3 Deterrence e¤ects of moderate leniency programs
Restricting focus to grim trigger strategies and assuming ° =0would immediately lead to
conclude that a moderate leniency program restricted to the …rst, spontaneously reporting
party cannot have deterrence e¤ects. This is because the incentive to defect, the left hand
side of condition (IC), is not reinforced by such a program: a defecting agent does no better
by reporting under a moderate leniency program than by just not reporting, which is possible
with or without the leniency program.25
However, we cannot take this irrelevance result too seriously. First, because the restric-
tion to ° =0and grim trigger strategies is not empirically warranted: as already mentioned,
defecting from a cartel today does not usually guarantee not to be convicted for yesterday’s
wrongdoing (although we showed it would be optimal if it did); and grim trigger strategies
are suboptimal for many oligopoly models, while real world punishment phases are often
short and tough. Second, because the result is inconsistent with the experience of the US’s
25A previous version of this paper assumed ° =0and emphasized this “irrelevance result” for the case
where …rms use grim trigger strategies; analogous results are derived by Motta and Polo (2001) and Rey
(2001), who also assume ° =0and grim trigger strategies.
21DoJ where in the last years about half of the applications for leniency have been falling under
Section A of the program, suggesting that moderate programs do have direct destabilizing
e¤ects on cartels (lead many agents to spontaneously self-report).
Allowing ° t ob ep o s i t i v ea n d… r m st ou s eo t h e rs t r a t e g i e st h a ng r i mt r i g g e ro n e sb r e a k
up the irrelevance result and unveil some reasons why moderate leniency programs may
have direct deterrence e¤ects. Note …rst that the constraint RF =0a n dL e m m a2t o g e t h e r
imply that moderate leniency programs are never exploitable, so that the left hand side of
condition (IC) does not change with their introduction (V c
i = V c0
i ). Then, only e¤ectivity
considerations matter, and we can state the following.
Proposition 7 Moderate leniency programs have deterrence e¤ects if and only if
1. 0 <R F<° F ; when F = Fr;
2. 0 <R F<° F+
±i(1¡¯)
1¡±i (vpr ¡ vp); when Fr >F :
The proposition highlights two reasons why moderate leniency programs may have de-
terrence e¤ects.
First, as long as there is a positive probability ° of being convicted for past collusive
activities when one defects from collusive strategies, the protection from …nes e¤ect is at
work: a moderate leniency program with RF < °F increases the value of defecting and
reporting by reducing the …ne expected by a defecting agent from °F to RF, while leaving
the value of colluding una¤ected. This e¤ect is independent of which punishment strategies
sustain collusion and of whether repeated o¤enders are punished more severely than …rst
time o¤enders.
Second, even if the Legislator optimally sets ° =0 ; as long as …rms use optimal two-
phase punishment strategies and recidivous wrongdoers are punished harder (Fr >F); there
is the protection from punishment e¤ect that encourages defections: a report raises …nes for
further collusion from F to Fr; which limits the costs …rms are willing to incur to punish
the agent that defected and reported, so that (vpr ¡ vp) > 0.
When both ° =0and vpr = vp (either because F = Fr or because …rms use grim trigger
strategies) the irrelevance result obtains: the conditions in Proposition 7 are necessary ones,
so that when no protection from …ne nor from punishment takes place moderate leniency
programs have no deterrence e¤ects. However, there is at least one additional reason why
moderate leniency programs may have direct deterrence e¤ects: they may increase the
perceived riskiness of entering or maintaining a collusive agreement.
7R i s k d o m i n a n c e
In previous sections we assumed that as long as the IC condition was satis…ed a collu-
sive/criminal agreement could be sustained; i.e. that coordination on the collusive agree-
ment was not a serious problem. Under this assumption, to deter a cartel a leniency program
had to ensure that the correspondent IC condition was violated. In this section we recognize
that in reality to set up an e¤ective collusive/criminal agreement agents must also establish
“trust”, they must be su¢ciently con…dent that all agents will indeed stick to the agreement.
With the multiple equilibria typical of dynamic strategic situations, coordination problems,
22and in particular risk dominance considerations (in the sense of Harsanyi and Selten (1988))
m a yp l a ya ni m p o r t a n tr o l e . 26 We will here take the view that besides being sustainable
in equilibrium, to be viable a collusive/criminal agreement must be su¢ciently “safe” from
coordination problems: it must not be risk dominated by defecting at any stage. If agents
do not play risk dominated equilibria, to deter a collusive/criminal agreement a leniency
programs need not go all the way to ensure that the correspondent IC condition is violated:
it is su¢cient that it makes the corresponding equilibrium risk dominated.27
To give a formal account of the potential e¤ects of leniency programs on the riskiness
of organized crime and keep what we are doing intuitive for the reader, we will work with
a simpli…ed version of our model where industries are duopolistic (N =2 )and agreements
are supported by grim trigger strategies.28 We continue assuming that establishing and
maintaining coordination on a collusive agreement generates each period hard information
that agents could report. Other features of the model remain also unchanged, including
the timing: …rst the Legislation sets policy parameters, then agents interact in the collu-
sive/criminal supergame. To simplify exposition and facilitate comparison with Spagnolo
and Blonski (2001) we let here ¡
i
denote the supergame beginning in industry i after the
Legislator has set the law enforcement parameters; ' denote a collusive equilibrium sup-
ported by grim trigger strategies 'j: “stick to the agreement until a defection is observed,
defect forever thereafter”, j =1 ;2;a n d! denote the defection equilibrium where each agent
plays the best response of the one-shot game forever.
7.1 Absent or ine¤ective leniency programs
When no leniency program is present (RF = F), or when the program is ine¤ective because
it is not su¢ciently generous (RF > °F), for an agent that unilaterally defects from a
collusive/criminal agreement it is a dominant strategy not to report information to the law
enforcing agency. Then, in the defection equilibrium ! each agent plays strategy !j : “defect
and don’t report (in case there is something to report), forever”. As in Blonski and Spagnolo
(2001), to evaluate the riskiness of a generic collusive/criminal agreement ' we can then
focus on a substructure of the supergame, the 2 £ 2¡game ¡
ino





called the '!¡formation of ¡
i
(the superscript no stands for no leniency
programs). The bimatrix-form of this game when agents establish a collusive/criminal
26Harsanyi and Selten (1988) favored payo¤-dominance over risk dominance as selection criterion, but the
theoretical and experimental support for risk dominance increased since then. Theoretical support has been
o¤ered by evolutionary game theory (Michihiro Kandori, George Mailath and Rafael Rob, 1993; Peyton
Young 1993) and global games (Hans Carlsson and Eric van Damme, 1993), and experiments showed that
agents priviledge risk and security considerations (John van Huyck, Raymond Battalio, and Richard Beil,
1990). Moreover, Harsanyi (1995) proposed later an alternative selection theory where he favoured risk
dominance over payo¤ dominance.
27Matthias Blonski and Spagnolo (2001) extended Harsanyi and Selten’s de…nition of risk dominance to …t
dynamic games with the strategic features of the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, and we will heavily rely on
their paradigm. Among other things, they show that the critical discount factor below which all cooperation
equilibria are risk dominated by defection is strictly higher than the discount factor at which cooperation
is supportable in equilibrium. This imples that if risk dominance matters we do not have to care anymore
about the IC condition.
28Besides ensuring that no “protection from punishment” e¤ect is at work, grim trigger strategies have
been shown to be the “safest” strategies with respect to the risk dominance concept: if a collusive/criminal
agreement is risk dominated when supported by grim trigger strategies, it is also risk dominated when it is




















where the values in the matrix are the discounted ‡ows of payo¤s agents expect, respectively:
when they both stick to the agreement, V c
i ;
when they unilaterally defect, Di = ¼d ¡ °F + ±iV n
i ; where V n
i = ¼n
1¡±i;
when their opponent unilaterally defects, Bi = ¼b ¡ ¯F + ±iV n
i ;
and when they both defect simultaneously, V n
i ¡ °F.
One can then apply Harsanyi and Selten’s (1988) original de…nition of risk dominance to
















i ¡ °F ¡ Bi
V n
i ¡ °F ¡ Bi
;
and then calculating the “Nash products” of its two pure strategy equilibria
u1(')u2(')=( V c
i ¡ ¼d + °F ¡ ±iV n
i )2,
v1(!)v2(!)=( ( 1 ¡ ±i)V n
i ¡ °F ¡ ¼b + ¯F)2 =
³
¼n ¡ ¼b +( ¯ ¡ °)F
´2
:
A generic criminal/collusive equilibrium ' is then risk dominated by ! when u1(')u2(') <
v1(!)v2(!), and its riskiness is measured by ½(')=v1(!)v2(!)¡u1(')u2('):29 With ine¤ec-
tive or absent leniency programs (RF > °F) the riskiness of a generic collusive agreement














i one sees that also for risk dominance considerations, with poor or absent
leniency programs it is optimal to set ° =0 : Increasing ° is costly and stabilizes crimi-
nal/collusive agreements, not only by making the IC condition less stringent (Proposition
1), but also by reducing the riskiness of criminal/collusive equilibria. Increasing ® increases
riskiness and deters criminal/collusive agreements, and since c®(0) = 0 setting ®>0 is
optimal. With ° =0and ®>0 increases in …nes increase the riskiness of collusion, and
since higher …nes imply no additional costs …nes should be set maximal.
29From Blonski and Spagnolo (2001) we know that if a cooperation equilibrium supported by grim trigger
strategies is not risk dominated by defecting at the beginning, then it is risk perfect, i.e. it is not risk
dominated by defecting at any later stage.
247.2 Leniency programs and risk
Let us now consider how e¤ective leniency programs (with RF · °F) a¤ect the riskiness of
collusive/criminal agreements. If an agent defects from a collusive agreement it is a dominant
strategy for him to report information to the law enforcing agency, hence in the defection
equilibrium ! agents play strategy !j : “defect and report (in case there is something to
report), forever”.
Consider leniency programs restricted to the …rst reporting party. When agents establish
a collusive/criminal agreement the bimatrix-form of the '!¡formation game ¡
irlp
'! (where


























i = ¼d ¡ RF + ±iV n
i , B0
i = ¼b ¡ F + ±iV n
i ,a n dL = RF+F
2 ; a n dt h er i s k i n e s so fa





















When eligibility to the leniency program is no restricted, i.e. when the program o¤ers
t h es a m er e d u c e d… n eRF to …rst and second reporting agent, ¡
iulp
'! (where ulp stands for
unrestricted leniency programs) has instead D0
i = ¼d ¡ RF + ±iV n
i , B0
i = ¼b ¡ RF + ±iV n
i ,












¡ ¼d + RF ¡ ±iV n
´2
:





i we obtain the following.









According to (1), collusive/criminal agreements are strictly more risky when eligibility
to the leniency policy is restricted to the …rst reporting agent, than when it is open to
all reporting agents. When the deterrence e¤ects of leniency programs are due to the
increase in the riskiness of collusion they generate, extending eligibility to full leniency to
other reporting agents than the …rst strictly reduces deterrence. The result is intuitively
appealing, since when eligibility is not restricted a colluding agent is “safer” in the sense
that he can always enjoy the …ne discounts o¤ered by the leniency policy by reporting,
whatever other agents do. It reinforces Proposition 2 o¤ering further theoretical support to
DoJ o¢cial’s assertion that the restriction to the …rst applicant is a crucial feature of the
leniency program, generating falls in trust and “rushes to report” among cartel members
(e.g. Hammond, 2000).
25According to (2), there are always restricted leniency programs that strictly increase the
riskiness of collusive/criminal agreements (this is not true for unrestricted programs). Note
that a restricted leniency program strictly increases the riskiness of collusion even when
RF = °F; i.e. when the leniency program is “moderate” and there is no “protection from
punishment” (so that the “irrelevance result” would obtain with respect to the IC condition).
The e¤ect on the riskiness of collusion is the third, important reason identi…ed in this paper
why even the current moderate leniency programs may have the direct deterrence e¤ects
they appear to have.
To conclude, we characterize the optimal law enforcement policy when risk dominance
considerations matter.
Proposition 9 Suppose agents do not play risk dominated equilibria. Then an optimal law
enforcement policy has:
1. A leniency program that restricts eligibility to the …rst applicant;
2. Maximal …nes F = F;
3. Maximal reward RF = ¡F if ±i < 2=3;
Reward RF = ¡F(1 ¡ 2®) if ±i > 2=3;
4. °;¯ =0and ® ¸ 0; with ®>0 i¤ at ® =0deterrence is not complete and ±i > 2=3.
The …rst statement is the immediate implication of Proposition 8 and needs no further
discussion. The second statement obtains because with restricted leniency programs the
riskiness of collusive/criminal agreements ½
rlp
i is monotonously increasing with …nes. This
is the case also for moderate leniency programs, a result capturing the intuition that these
strategic risk by making the event of being …ned due to another agent’s reporting information
more salient. The fact that riskiness increases with the severity of …nes suggests that – unless
heavier sanctions against cartels are introduced – the new leniency program of the European
Commission will likely not be as successful as the DoJ’s one, even though the two programs
are similar in most aspects.
As for reduced …nes/rewards, according to (3) they should be maximal when the discount
factor is low, but may have to be kept less than maximal when it is high. This is because high
rewards make the program exploitable (when ®>0), increasing V c0
i and pushing down ½
rlp
i :
Since the gains from exploiting the program are distributed in time, this force is stronger
the higher the discount factor. Finally, (4) obtains for the same reason why analogous
r e s u l t so b t a i n e di nP r o p o s i t i o n s4 ,5a n d6 :w i t hl e n i e n c yp r o g r a m s° and ¯ are irrelevant,
while if deterrence is not complete at ® =0it may be worthwhile to increase deterrence by
accompanying the leniency program with public investigations.
8C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In this …nal section we brie‡y discuss some important aspects of the real world that for
reason of space could not be incorporated in the model.
Misreporting. Our stylized model with no mistakes in law enforcement highlighted
the potential bene…ts of “high-powered incentives” in law enforcement policy. Of course, if
26one allows for more realism by introducing asymmetric information and mistakes, will …nd
that there may be drawbacks in o¤ering high rewards to law violators that spontaneously
self-report. One potential drawback often put forward as a reason why (nowadays) rewards
are seldom used is that these may induce agents to distort/fabricate information. Indeed,
the US prosecutors’ practice of awarding reductions in sanctions and monetary rewards
in exchange for testimony – “soft” information easy to fabricate/distort – is a dangerous
and highly debated one.30 However, this potential drawback can be dealt with directly –
restricting eligibility to agents reporting “hard” information, not allowing for testimony,
and substantially increasing sanctions against information fabrication/distortion – rather
that indirectly, by giving up the potentially large social gains from high-powered leniency
programs.
Further research could better clarify the issue. Though, we see at least two reasons why
information fabrication/distortion may not be a serious obstacle to the implementation of
the optimal schemes proposed in this paper. First, the incentives to distort/fabricate infor-
mation created by rewards are fully analogous to those generated by the possibility to obtain
damage settlements in private law suites. Nobody claims that damage payments should not
be allowed for in private suites because they create incentives to fabricate information. In
fact, distinguishing reliable from unreliable information – and deciding on the base of the
…rst – is the normal task of courts of justice. Second, fabricating information in a trial is
subject to severe criminal sanctions. Innocent parties accused by an agent who fabricated
information will have all the incentives – and in the case of cartels the …nancial resources –
to …ght back and demonstrate their innocence and the …rst agent’s wrongdoing. Fabricating
information to cash rewards appears therefore an extremely risky activity.
Treble damages. When a cartel is successfully prosecuted, all former cartel members,
including …rms that self-reported and cooperated with the Antitrust Authority, are exposed
to suits for damages from their customers. How does this feature of reality a¤ects our
analysis?
It is easy to realize that taking damages into account does not alter any of our conclu-
sions. Let E[D]; with E[D] > 0; denote the damages a …rm expects to pay if convicted for
collusive behavior, and E[RD]; with E[RD] ¸ 0; the damages a …rm that spontaneously
self-reports expects to pay, with E[RD] · E[D] (at present both in the EU and US it is
RD = D, but in light of our previous results it is not hard to see why one may wish to
protect reporting …rms by setting E[RD] <E [D]): Now let us rede…ne variables in the pre-
vious sections so that F = MF + E[D] and RF = RMF + E[RD]; where MF and RMF
stand for …nes and reduced …nes respectively. It is immediate to verify that all our results
continue to apply, whit the only di¤erence that …ne reductions/rewards must be increased
to compensate for expected damage payments. Moreover, if we allow E[RD] and E[D] to
di¤er, it becomes clear that as long as increasing rewards for self-reporting …rms is more
costly than modifying the law to protect them from damage suits, the Legislator’s optimal
policy is to set E[RD]=0 : In practice, this implies that present leniency programs are not
30Some debated cases where US prosecutors exchanged rewards against testimony are discussed at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/snitch/readings/paying.htmlpaying.html Reporting agents
were asked to testify even though the provisions of 18 USC Section 201(c)(2) explicitely makes it an of-
f e n s et op a yaw i t n e s sf o rt e s t i f y i n g .A sm e n t i o n e d ,w er e g a r da sam i s t a k et oa s kr e p o r t i n ga g e n t st ot e s t i f y
when they receive leniency. In this paper we excluded testimony assuming that to obtain leniency an agent
must provide “hard” information (videotapes, documents, etc.).
27even constrained-optimal: they would be optimal moderate programs only if they would
protect a reporting …rm from being sued for damages.
Restitution. According to the US Corporate Leniency Program, to obtain leniency
self-reporting …rms are required to pay back collusive pro…ts to customers (“if they can,”
that is, if this do not drive them bankrupt; see Spratling, 1998). It is easy to verify that when
self-reporting …rms must pay back realized collusive pro…ts to customers the attractiveness
of defecting and reporting is reduced. As for damages, then higher …ne discounts/rewards
are needed to compensate for these additional losses if one wishes to deter cartels by in-
ducing …rms to spontaneously self-report. The restitution requirement is unambiguously
counterproductive and should be eliminated.
Individuals vs. Organizations. In the paper we focused on generic agents or …rms.
In reality, agents of criminal organizations are sometimes themselves organizations composed
of many individuals. This is the case for …rms within a cartel. Allowing individual employees
t h a tr e p o r ti n f o r m a t i o no nac a r t e li nw h i c ht h e i r… r mi si n v o l v e dt oc a s ht h eo p t i m a lr e w a r d s
discussed in this paper (the sum of all …nes paid by convicted …rms) exponentially increases
agents’ incentives to report, and the deterrence e¤ects of the program. However, individual
leniency programs undermine trust not only between, but also within each colluding …rms,
which may be costly. Aubert et al. (in progress) focus of the additional deterrence e¤ects
generated by individual leniency programs, and on the potential costs of the internal lack
of trust they bring with.
Violence. Criminal organizations often arrange for credible, violent sanctions against
members that turn them down. This may even be true for cartels. For example, Gam-
betta and Reuter (1995) argue that, in Sicily, Ma…a has met the enforcement demand of
oligopolistic …rms with a supply of coordination and enforcement services, particularly in
procurement auction markets. In these situations, …rms (or executives) that self-report risk
their life, and to be e¤ective leniency programs must try to compensate for this risk by
providing e¤ective protection, besides su¢ciently high rewards.
9A p p e n d i x : P r o o f s
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 . Fines are costless to administer and, being transfers, do not di-
rectly a¤ect social welfare, hence an optimal law enforcement policy sets them to maximize
crime/cartel deterrence by making inequality (2) as stringent as possible. The conditions
in the statements obtain by di¤erentiating (2). Suppose …rst that F and Fr can be set
independently: Bringing all terms of (2) on the left hand side we obtain net gains from
collusion
V c
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28which is negative when
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from which statements 1i) follows.
Consider now the e¤ect of changes in Fr on net gain from (…rst time) collusion. We
have
@(V c



















@Fr . To understand the sign of @vcr
@Fr ; note …rst that if Fr




@Fr =0 : If collusion can still be sustained then expected gains from further collusion are
V cr
i = ¼c¡®F r
1¡±i ; so that @vcr
@Fr = ¡®<0: Since @vpr
@Fr ¸ 0 statement 1ii) follows.
Suppose now that it must be F = Fr: Then V c = ¼c¡®F
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and positive otherwise. Statement 2 follows. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . An optimal law enforcement policy maximizes deterrence





@° = F ¸ 0; when F>0 condition (2) is more stringent the smaller is °: This
and c0
° > 0 imply that setting ° =0i so p t i m a l .L e m m a1a n d° =0together imply that
the optimal …nes are F = F;and Fr = Fr: ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 . If …rms agree to collude and report, each …rm’s expected gains
from collusion are
V c0




1) If all …rms are eligible and Fr
i = Fi then vcr =( 1¡ ±i)V c





1¡±i and V c0
i >Vc
i when RF < ®F:
2) If all …rms are eligible but Fr
i >F i; it is still V c0
i = ¼c¡RF
1¡±i ; but after being convicted
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3) If only one …rm is eligible and Fr = F then again vcr =( 1¡ ±i)V c
i and V c
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4) If only the …rst reporting …rm is eligible and Fr
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the leniency program, the value of defecting is V d0
i = ¼d ¡ RF + ±ivpr
1¡±i :
1) Independent of how many …rms are eligible or the defecting only, with Fr = F;
















) RF < °F:
2) Independent of whether only the …rst reporting …rm or all …rms are eligible, when
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) RF < °F +
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1 ¡ ±i
(1 ¡ ¯)(vpr ¡ vp):
30¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .Follows directly from Lemma 2 (restricting eligibility reduces
V c0
i ) and Lemma 3 (restricting eligibility does not a¤ect V d0
i ). ¥









as stringent as possible.
Consider …rst the case Fr
i = Fi and vp = ¼n. Then the leniency program is exploitable if
RF < ®F ¡(1¡®)(N ¡1)F; and is e¤ective if RF < °F: Although °<® ;for the relevant
parameter range (®<1
2 and N ¸ 2)i ti s®F ¡ (N ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ®)F<0 <° F :Then:
In the region RF > °F the leniency program is irrelevant, it is neither exploitable nor
e¤ective.
In the region ®F ¡ (N ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ®)F<R F<° Fthe program is e¤ective (V d0
i ¸ V d
i )
and is not exploitable (V c0
i <Vc
i ). From Lemma 3 we know that V d0
i is decreasing in RF;
so that in this region it is optimal to decrease RF to make the IC condition more stringent
by increasing its right hand side.
In the region RF · ®F ¡(N ¡1)(1¡®)F the program is both e¤ective and exploitable,
and a reduction of RF increases both the left and the right hand side of condition IC. When
RF · ®F ¡ (N ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ®)F condition IC can be written as
V c0
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Consider now the other case, where Fr >Fand such that vp <v pr = vcr = ¼n: Then
colluding and reporting V c0
i is not sustainable for more than one period, since after the
…rst period that …rms collude and report, they become repeated o¤enders, …nes grow up to
Fr; and collusion is no more sustainable. This implies that the leniency program is never
exploitable: at each point in time agents strictly prefer to defect and report, which delivers
¼d ¡RF + ±i¼n





i is not a¤ected by RF while V d0
i is decreasing in RF; the optimal program minimizes
RF; i.e. RF¤ = RF = ¡(N ¡ 1)F. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . Parameters ° and ¯ do not a¤ect the IC condition and
are costly to increase, hence their optimal level is ° = ¯ =0 .F r o m P r o p o s i t i o n 3 w e
31know that when ® =0the optimal program has RF = ¡(N ¡ 1)F in all cases (including
intermediate ones not characterized by the proposition). Keeping RF = ¡(N ¡ 1)F and
letting F grow, the IC condition for each industry becomes more stringent (the left hand
side V c
i is independent of RF and F, while the right hand side V d0
i increases with F). Hence
there must be a …nite level of the …ne F0 such that for …nes higher than this level the IC
condition is not satis…ed in any industry (the critical discount factor at which collusion is
supportable becomes higher than ±max).¥
Proof of Proposition 5. Again, setting ° = ¯ =0is optimal because increasing them
is costly and does not make the IC condition more stringent, and setting F = F;Fr = F
r is
optimal because it makes the IC more stringent than at any other level of …nes while raising
…nes is not costly. In addition:
1) When F = Fr, vp = ¼n and F>¼ c ¡¼n ¡ ¼d¡¼c
N¡1 ;R F ¤ = ®F ¡(N ¡1)(1¡®)F and
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(¼d ¡ ¼n ¡ ®F +( N ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ®)F)2
= F
¼d ¡ F ¡ ¼n ¡ N(¼c ¡ F + ¼n)




increasing ® increases deterrence by making the IC condition more stringent. Hence, if
complete deterrence is not achieved at ® =0and RF¤ = ¡(N ¡ 1)F; and if c0
®(0) is
smaller than the marginal social bene…t of further deterrence, it is optimal to set ®>0 and
RF¤ = ®F ¡ (N ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ®)F<¡(N ¡ 1)F:
2) When F = Fr, vp = ¼n but F<¼ c ¡ ¼n ¡ ¼d¡¼c










, ±i ¸ ± =
¼d +( N ¡ 1)F ¡ ¼c
¼d +(N ¡ 1)F ¡ ¼n:
This is the best exploitable program. The best non-exploitable one (with RF > ®F ¡(N ¡
1)(1 ¡ ®)F)d e l i v e r s
±i ¸ ±0 =
¼d +(N ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ®)F ¡ ¼c








Hence ® =0and RF¤ = RF = ¡(N ¡ 1)F is the global optimum:
323) When Fr >Fand vp = vpr = vcr = ¼n the leniency program is never exploitable
since after a report collusion is no more sustainable, in which case it is a dominant strategy
for each agent to immediately report and defect from any agreement. Then the relevant





@® < 0 and
@V d
i
@® =0 , an increase in ® does make the IC
condition more stringent. It follows that when complete deterrence is not costlessly achieved
by setting ® =0and RF = RF = ¡(N ¡ 1)F,i fc0
®(0) is smaller than the marginal social
bene…t of additional deterrence the second best law enforcement policy has ®>0 (and
RF¤ = RF = ¡(N ¡ 1)F):¥
Proof of Proposition 6. The …rst part follows immediately from Propositions 3 and
4. For the second part, setting ° = ¯ =0is optimal because increasing them is costly and
does not a¤ect the IC condition, and setting F = F; Fr = F
r is optimal because it makes
the IC more stringent at no cost.
For the relevant parameters range (®<1
2)i ti s
RF¤¤ =0>® F¡ (N ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ®)F>¡(N ¡ 1)F;









@® =0 ; increasing ® increases deterrence by making the IC condition more stringent.
Hence if complete deterrence is not achieved at ® =0and if c0
®(0) is smaller than the
marginal social bene…t of further deterrence, it is optimal to set ®>0: ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 . Su¢ciency follows immediately from Lemma 3. As for
necessity, the only other case is RF ¸ °F (+
±i(1¡¯)
1¡±i (¼n ¡ vp)): Assume this is the case.
Then V d
i ¸ V d0








i ; and given V c
i = V c0
i condition (IC) remains unchanged. ¥



















which is always satis…ed when RF · °F. Introducing a restricted leniency program is
optimal if it increase riskiness without raising costs ½
rlp
i >½ no
























i ¡ ¼d + °F ¡ ±iV n
i
´2
which is always satis…ed because ¯<1
2 and RF · °F: ¥
33P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9 .Statement 1) follows immediately from Lemma 4.











When the leniency program is not exploitable maxfV c
i ;Vc0
i g = V c
i and since @V c
i =@F =
¡ ®
1¡±i < 0 it is @½
rlp
i =@F > 0: When the program is exploitable maxfV c
i ;Vc0
i g = V c0
i and
@V c0
i =@F = ¡ 1
2(1¡±i) < 0; and again @½
rlp
i =@F > 0:











When the program is not exploitable maxfV c
i ;Vc0
i g = V c




i =@RF = ¡3 < 0: Hence it is always optimal to reduce RF (increase …ne dis-
counts/rewards) until V c
i = V c0







@RF = ¡ 1
2(1¡±i); and @½
rlp
i =@RF < 0 i¤ 1
1¡±i < 3: Hence if ±i < 2=3 the optimal reward
is the maximal one RF = ¡F: If ±i > 2=3 the optimal reward is such that V c
i = V c0
i ; i.e.
®F = F+RF
2 , (2® ¡ 1)F = RF.
4) With RF · °F parameters ¯ and ° do not a¤ect riskiness, and they are costly to
increase; hence it is optimal to set them equal to 0. If the leniency program does not achieve
complete deterrence at ® =0additional deterrence is socially bene…cial; since c0
®(0) = 0,a t
the optimum it must be ®>0 if deterrence increases with ®: This is always the case when





¼n ¡ ¼b +





¼c ¡ (2® ¡ 1)F
1 ¡ ±i








= ¡2F ¡ 2(
¡2F
1 ¡ ±i
+2 F) > 0 if ±i > 1=3:






















@® =0 : Hence it is optimal to set ® =0 : ¥
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